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ABSTRACT 
ATTITUDINAL COMMITMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF  
RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
by 
 
Anwar ul Haq 
 
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the supervision of Professor Edward Hinchman 
 
          In this paper I propose an account of attitudinal commitments which flow from avowed be-
liefs and intentions. I distinguish my account from Thomas Scanlon’s account of attitudinal commit-
ments on which our beliefs about normative reasons are the source of these commitments. In my 
view, attitudinal commitments result from avowal of certain attitudes and are best understood in 
terms of the attitudinal integrity of agents with respect to those attitudes. Rationality, I argue, is a 
matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the attitudinal commit-
ments we undertake. 
          My account of attitudinal commitments makes room for progress on a question which is the 
ultimate focus of this paper, namely, the question of the scope of rational requirements. Concerning 
the conditional requirements of rationality, the question of scope arises, i.e., whether these require-
ments have a wide or narrow scope. Both wide and narrow scope rational requirements have their 
shortcomings. However, once we accept the correct account of attitudinal commitments, I argue 
that a theory of rationality can make progress beyond the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope re-
quirements of rationality. I provide the outline of such a theory. 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Abstract 
                            ii  
Acknowledgements                iv 
 
1 Introduction                             1 
 
2 Wide versus Narrow Scope: What is at Stake?                 4 
          2.1 The Wrong of Irrationality                 5 
          2.2 The Symmetry Problem                 7 
          2.3 The Bootstrapping of Reasons and the Normativity of Rationality             9 
 
3 Consequential Commitments               10 
          3.1 Avowal and Consequential Commitments               10 
          3.2 Consequential Commitments and Attitudinal Integrity            12 
          3.3 The Wrong of Irrationality               16 
 
4 A Hybrid Theory of Rationality               18 
          4.1 Desiderata D3 and D4: Illicit Bootstrapping and the Normativity of Rationality         19 
          4.2 Desideratum D2: Rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable  
                ways                19 
                4.2.1 The Scanlon-Kolodny View of Rationality             24 
          4.3 Desideratum D1: Capture the Force of the Wrong of Irrationality           27 
 
5 Conclusion               30 
 
References                32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
          I consider myself extremely lucky to have spent two wonderful years at UWM. I say this de-
spite the two winters I have had to brave. The chilly nights and frigid winds—it was all worth it. 
Here I got a chance to spend time with terrific philosophers, both within the faculty and students. If 
there is any philosophical achievement I have made, or might make, without a doubt I owe it to 
them. 
          This project emerged from a wonderful lecture Ted Hinchman gave last spring. Throughout 
the progress of this project, Ted has been the source of boundless support. He encouraged me, chal-
lenged me, and guided me to go beyond merely technical argumentation and keep in view the bigger 
picture. More than anyone else, Ted has taught me to try to never lose sight of what is ultimately im-
portant. I should also add that despite the occasional bouts of self-doubt, my several conversations 
with Ted have, in ways unbeknownst to me, given me the confidence that I might end up just fine. 
For that, and much else, I will always be in debt. 
          I am deeply indebted to Luca Ferrero as well who has been as important a pillar of support. 
He invested his time and energy in giving extensive comments on countless drafts of this paper. All 
merits of this work owe him a great deal. And throughout my stay at UWM, I knew that if I needed 
any advice, philosophical or professional, Luca will be kind enough to make himself available. And 
he always did. 
          I owe special thanks to Stan Husi. Since the very first day I arrived at UWM he made me feel 
at home, both in the seminars and outside. I have had wonderful conversations with Stan over cof-
fee and meals. I know much more about philosophy, and the profession in general, due to his in-
sights. 
 
  
v 
          I was very luck to have Joshua Spencer among my teachers. His exacting standards of clarity 
have helped me grow both as a philosopher and a writer. And I am particularly thankful for his gen-
erous—and always better—reconstructions of my jumbled metaphysical thoughts. Whenever I 
thought I had only muttered gibberish, his reconstructions made me realize there might be an intelli-
gible thought in the vicinity. 
          When I enrolled on Blain Neufeld’s seminar on Rawls, I thought I already knew a fair amount 
about Rawls’s thought. Blain’s lectures made me realize that I was quite mistaken. Blain helped me 
leave behind my narrow understanding of Rawls’s work and appreciate its deeper complexities. 
          I would also like to thank Bill Bristow, Stephen Leeds, and Fabrizio Mondadori. Bill has in-
stilled in me a love for engaging deeply with the history of philosophy. Steve has rekindled my inter-
est in formal logic. And Fabrizio spared a lot of time to have lovely conversations with me in the 
corridors. 
          My list of acknowledgments will remain terribly incomplete if I do not thank my wonderful 
friends in the department. They challenged me in seminars, patiently listened to my half-baked phil-
osophical thoughts, gave me helpful comments on this paper, and taught me in ways they might not 
realize. Most importantly, they made me feel welcome in a foreign land. 
          I would like to thank Diane and Georgette for making my stay at UWM so pleasant. They 
have encyclopedic knowledge about all administrative details. And they are among the nicest people 
I know. I would also like to thank the Graduate School of Letters and Science for offering me a fel-
lowship which allowed me to devote more time to this project. 
          Finally, I owe the deepest debt to my parents. Not only did they allow me to pursue what I 
love, they sacrificed their needs in order to support my passion. What could be more noble? I am 
eternally grateful for their love, kindness, and support.
 
  
1 
1. Introduction 
Consider the following case. Suppose Alex believes he ought to have salad for lunch everyday. 
Yet when he visits a restaurant, Alex cannot bring himself to intend to order a salad. He ends up 
having steak for lunch. Intuitively, Alex seems to have done something wrong. Moreover, suppose we 
are told that, unknown to Alex, an accident happened in the kitchen and the salad ingredients got 
contaminated. Despite this additional information, our intuition that Alex has gone wrong in failing 
to intend to order salad does not go away. The persistence of our intuition is best explained by distin-
guishing two kinds of normative relations. First, there is a relation of being a reason for. This is a 
relation between facts and a person’s attitudes. Secondly, there are relations specified by the require-
ments of rationality. These are relations among a person’s attitudes in abstraction from actual reasons 
for them. By failing to intend to order salad, Alex has accidentally responded to reasons correctly. 
Regardless, Alex appears to have done something wrong because he has fallen prey to irrationality. 
The purported relationship between normative reasons and rationality has rightly received 
much attention. One proposal is offered by Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005): that rationality is a 
matter of bringing our attitudes in line with our beliefs about (normative) reasons. This view presup-
poses an attractive conception of reasons: that reasons are independent of the present attitudes or 
activities of individual agents. Call this view the ‘reasons-first view’ of normative reasons.1 Contra 
Scanlon’s and Kolodny's understanding of rationality, I propose that we can revise our understanding 
of what a view of rationality might look like, without thereby giving up the core commitments of the 
reasons-first view. The proposal is made possible after we notice a particular kind of normativity which 
underlies some of our beliefs and intentions. 
                                                
1 The reasons-first view captures a common thread which runs through the relevant views of Dancy (2000), 
Kolodny (2005), Parfit (2011), Raz (1999), and Scanlon (2014). 
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I propose an account of attitudinal commitments which flow from our avowed beliefs and 
intentions. When you avow an attitude you thereby undertake attitudinal commitments to have certain 
other attitudes or perform certain actions. I call these attitudinal commitments, ‘consequential com-
mitments.’2 Consequential commitments are best understood in terms of the attitudinal integrity of 
agents with respect to particular attitudes. If an agent follows through on consequential commitments, 
she thereby preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to the corresponding attitudes. Against the 
background of consequential commitments, I argue that rationality is a matter of maintaining coher-
ence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments we undertake. Contra 
Scanlon’s and Kolodny's account of rationality, the view which emerges from the following discussion 
shows that forming beliefs about reasons, and acting in light of them, is not the only species of re-
sponsiveness to reasons. What is distinctive about reason-responsive agents is their capability to avow 
their attitudes and undertake consequential commitments. 
My alternative proposal, then, introduces the normative element of consequential commit-
ments, and departs from Scanlon’s and Kolodny’s understanding of rationality. The proposal makes 
room for progress on a question which is the ultimate focus of this paper, namely, the question of the 
scope of rational requirements. A theory of rationality includes, among other requirements, several 
conditional requirements of rationality. Concerning the conditional requirements, the question of 
scope arises, i.e., whether these requirements have a wide or narrow scope. Both wide and narrow 
scope rational requirements have their shortcomings. Wide scope requirements fall short of capturing 
the force of the wrong of irrationality. For instance, they charge Alex of mere incoherence of attitudes. 
                                                
2 I borrow the terminology of ‘avowal’ from Moran (2001). My use of it is similar to Moran’s except that 
I am neutral about the issue whether avowal and self-knowledge are as closely connected as Moran sug-
gests. Moreover, my account of consequential commitments is a departure from Moran. Moran does not 
formulate his view in terms of attitudinal commitments. Brandom (2003:191), however, gives an account 
of consequential commitments in the case of making assertions. My account of consequential commit-
ments is roughly modeled on his account. Nevertheless, my account is not on all fours with Brandom’s 
for my account does not go all the way to accepting expressivism. 
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Whereas, intuitively, Alex has gone wrong in a more forceful way: having formed the belief that he 
ought to F, he has failed to direct his behavior in light of this belief. Secondly, wide scope rational 
requirements are symmetrical in objectionable ways. They draw no distinction between different ways 
of satisfying them. Narrow scope requirements do not have these shortcomings. However, if we ac-
cept our well-entrenched intuition that rationality is normative, narrow scope requirements lead to 
illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. Moreover, narrow scope requirements may require us to 
do what we ought not to do. I argue that, given my alternative proposal, a theory of rationality can make 
progress beyond the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope requirements of rationality. My alternative 
proposal makes possible a hybrid theory of rationality which overcomes the respective shortcomings 
of wide and narrow scope requirements. The hybrid theory includes (a) wide scope requirements in 
conjunction with the basing prohibitions of rationality, and (b) additional narrow scope evaluative 
principles of rationality. The hybrid theory is not proposed as a radically new theory of rationality. 
Rather it is an attempt at improving on the existing narrow scope and wide scope theories, especially 
Broome (2013), in light of their respective shortcomings. 
The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I start with contrasting the wide and narrow scope 
rational requirements. I outline what is at stake when we face the choice between wide and narrow 
scope requirements. In §3, I propose my account of consequential commitments which flow from 
avowed attitudes. In §4, against the background of consequential commitments, and in contrast to 
Scanlon’s and Kolodny's view of rationality, I outline a hybrid theory of rationality which overcomes 
the shortcomings of wide and narrow scope rational requirements. 
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2. Wide versus Narrow Scope: What is at Stake? 
Let me mention two provisos at the outset. First, I presuppose the reasons-first view about 
normative reasons. By contrast, some Humeans like Schroeder (2007) and Kantians like Korsgaard 
(1996) deny the reasons-first view. I do not commit myself to the truth of either side of the divide. 
The thesis I argue for is a conditional: if the reasons-first view is correct, then we have good reason to 
accept the proposed hybrid theory of rationality. However, if the reasons-first view is incorrect, the 
following discussion is still useful. It clarifies the dispute over the scope of rational requirements. 
Secondly, I focus on a particular requirement of rationality, namely, the  enkratic requirement. The 
conclusions I draw, however, are supposed to generalize mutatis mutandis to all conditional require-
ments of rationality. I now introduce the wide scope enkratic requirement.3 
EW: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you believe you ought to F, then you intend 
to F.)4 
It is a wide scope requirement because the requirement takes as its scope the entire conditional (if you 
believe you ought to F, then you intend to F.) The requirement requires that you satisfy the condi-
tional. There are two ways to satisfy it: by giving up your normative belief (i.e. the belief that you ought 
to F) or by forming the enkratic intention (i.e. the intention to F). Consequently, if you in fact believe 
that you ought to F, EW does not require that you intend to F. EW does not allow detachment of the 
consequent of the conditional. This feature of the wide scope requirements blocks the modus ponens 
inference to the normative conclusion that rationality requires of you that you intend to F.5 On the 
                                                
3 Broome (2013), Brunero (2012), Dancy (2000), Darwall (1983), Shpall (2013), Wallace (2001), and Way 
(2011) defend versions of the wide scope view. I mostly focus on Broome (2013). 
4 Broome (2013:170) formulates the requirement in more detail as a synchronic requirement. The rough 
formulation will suffice for our purposes. Moreover, in this paper I do not discuss the distinction between 
synchronic and diachronic versions of rational requirements, mainly because both versions meet the four 
desiderata (outlined below) I suggest a theory of rationality must attempt to meet. We must introduce 
additional desiderata to resolve this matter, the task I leave for another paper. 
5 Another way to block the inference is to maintain that ‘if’ in the conditional is expressing something 
other than a material conditional. Price (2008) considers this possibility. 
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other hand, if the enkratic requirement were a narrow scope requirement, it would take as its scope 
(intend to F.) The narrow scope requirement reads as:  
 EN: Necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, rationality requires of you that you intend  
 to F. 
There is only one way to satisfy this requirement: by forming the enkratic intention. EN, therefore, 
allows detachment of normative conclusions by allowing the modus ponens inference to go through. 
Both wide and narrow scope requirements (I argue) have their limitations. Wide scope require-
ments fall short of capturing the force of the wrong of irrationality. Secondly, they are symmetrical in 
objectionable ways. Narrow scope requirements do not have these two shortcomings. However, if we 
assume that rationality is normative, narrow scope requirements lead to illicit bootstrapping of nor-
mative reasons. Let’s start with the shortcomings of wide scope requirements first. 
 
2.1 The Wrong of Irrationality 
Recall the case of Alex, the akratic person.6 He fails to intend enkratically according to his 
normative belief. Alex’s irrational behavior exemplifies akrasia.7 Most wide and narrow scope theorists 
of rationality accept that a theory of rationality must evaluate an akratic person as going wrong in 
some sense.8 But in what sense is akrasia a wrong? On the wide scope view, the wrong of akrasia 
amounts to violating the relevant wide scope rational requirement. Recall that to violate EW is to either 
fail to form the enkratic intention or to fail to drop the normative belief. The wide scope wrong of 
akrasia effectively amounts to the claim that it is wrong of you to be in an incoherent state of mind. 
However, the wide scope charge of incoherence appears to be implausibly weak. For instance, in case 
                                                
6 To make the examples more vivid, the first character of the names involved matches with the kind of 
behavior those persons exhibit. 
7 Alex’s behavior is one kind of akratic behavior. Rorty (1980:333) identifies five kinds of akrasia. 
8 For instance, both Broome (2013:31) and Schroeder (2004, 2009) make this assumption. 
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of Alex we expect Alex’s belief that he ought to F to influence the direction of his behavior. His 
normative belief must make a difference to what else it is now appropriate to do or think from his 
point of view. Alex has gone wrong in failing to appropriately direct his behavior in light of his nor-
mative belief. The wide scope charge of mere incoherence overlooks this failing. The narrow scope 
view, on the other hand, captures the force of this failing. The violation of EN charges Alex of failing 
to intend in accordance with his normative belief. 
You might wonder whether the wide scope charge of incoherence, at bottom, is the same as 
the narrow scope charge of failing to direct behavior in light of the relevant belief. It is not. To bring 
out the contrast from the point of view of enkratic rationality, imagine the following scenario. You 
believe that you ought to F, and having conscientiously deliberated, you are confident that the belief 
is true. Now suppose you fail to intend to F. The narrow scope charge holds that you are going wrong 
unless you follow through in light of your normative belief. After all, you are confident that your belief 
is true. And in failing to follow through, you are being inappropriately evasive. The wide scope charge, 
on the other hand, is different. It holds that you are going wrong unless you either follow through on 
your normative belief or somehow rid yourself of the relevant belief. Either way, you will achieve 
coherence among your attitudes, and by rationality’s lights you’ll have done alright.  The wide scope-
charge, therefore, is not the same as, and is weaker than, the narrow scope charge. I have argued that 
the narrow scope charge is more plausible.9 
                                                
9 A further complication: you might think that my characterization of the wide scope charge is lacking. For 
even if the wide scope enkratic requirement allows that you somehow rid yourself of the normative belief 
in order to become more coherent, it is possible that in doing so you are violating the requirement of 
epistemic rationality. So, one the wide-scope view, you might still count as going wrong from the point of 
view of epistemic rationality. In response, note that the relevant requirement of epistemic rationality is a 
wide scope requirement, too. That requirement reads as: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you 
judge that you ought to F, then believe that you ought to F.) So in order to rid yourself of the relevant 
belief in order to satisfy the enkratic requirement, from the point of view of epistemic rationality you can 
either revise your judgment or somehow rid yourself of the judgment too. The charge of going wrong, 
from the point of view of epistemic rationality, would still be a charge of incoherence. The worry I’m 
pressing, therefore, won’t go away but only reemerge at the epistemic level. 
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Given the preceding discussion, it appears to be an important desideratum for a theory of 
rationality that, D1, it must capture the force of the wrong of irrationality. The wide scope view fails 
to meet this desideratum. The narrow scope view meets it successfully. 
 
2.2 The Symmetry Problem 
The wide scope view is problematic for a second reason. It faces the now famous symmetry 
problem.10 Suppose Robin believes she ought to finalize her paper tonight and send it out for review. 
However, she gives in to procrastination and no longer plans to finish the task. Moreover, Robin 
rationalizes her behavior. On the basis of her failure to intend to finish her paper, Robin drops her 
belief that she ought to finish it tonight. This is a paradigmatic case of self-deception; rationalization 
is irrational behavior.11 Recall that EW requires Robin to satisfy a conditional. EW is symmetrical in 
that it draws no normative distinction between the two ways to satisfy the conditional: denying the 
antecedent—i.e. giving up the normative belief—and affirming the consequent—i.e. forming the 
enkratic intention. The objection is that Robin’s normative situation is not symmetrical in this way. 
For we think Robin must not drop her normative belief on the basis of failing to intend enkratically. 
We can make the point in another way. We need a theory of rationality to explain the following 
data: rationalizing behavior is always irrational; and enkratic behavior is always rational. EW fails to 
                                                
10 Versions of the symmetry problem are pressed, among others, by Kolodny (2005, 2007), Lord (2014), 
Price (2008), Scanlon (2007), Schroeder (2004, 2009) and Shpall (2013). 
11 Not all behavior which involves dropping the normative belief on the basis of one’s failure to intend 
accordingly amounts to rationalization. Cases of ‘rational’ akrasia (e.g. the famous Huck Finn case), or 
cases where one discovers that the object of intention cannot be realized, and so on, are not cases of 
rationalization. Moreover, rationalization is structurally different from akrasia. In case of akrasia a person 
retains their normative belief and nonetheless fails to intend enkratically. Whereas rationalization is an 
irrational resolution of akrasia. 
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register this asymmetry. It treats both kinds of behavior on a par. The narrow scope enkratic require-
ment, however, is not symmetrical in this way for there is only one way to satisfy it: by forming the 
enkratic intention.12 
This brings us to the second desideratum a theory of rational requirements must attempt to 
meet, namely, D2: rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways. The wide 
scope requirements fail to meet D2 (and D1) whereas the narrow scope requirements meet D2 (and 
D1) successfully. 
(Before I move on, I should mention that the wide scope theorists have tried to solve the 
symmetry problem. One solution is offered by John Broome (2013). In §4.2 I argue that Broome’s 
solution is on the right track—though it has a shortcoming which I’ll point out. However, the difficulty 
Broome faces is that his view itself does not have the resources to offer his solution. The reason for 
this is that in response to Scanlon’s view of attitudinal commitments, which Broome finds too strong, 
and which leads to a narrow scope view of rational requirements, Broome (2013:100) wishes to remain 
noncommittal about the normative commitments which underlie our attitudes. The account of attitu-
dinal commitments I offer below carves out a middle grounds between Broome’s evasiveness and 
Scanlon’s view of attitudinal commitments. My account provides the resources to offer a solution to 
the symmetry problem which is similar to Broome’s.) 
 
                                                
12 A clarification is in order. The symmetry problem comes to the fore when you hold the belief that you 
ought to F and you seek guidance from the enkratic requirement about to what to do. EN gives you only 
one option: to form the corresponding intention. EW, on the other hand, gives you two options: either 
form the enkratic intention or drop the normative belief. The symmetry objection is that EW draws no 
normative distinction between the two ways of satisfying it. Now there is another problem in the neigh-
borhood. Suppose you have dropped the belief that you ought to F. Now, as it happens, you have escaped 
EN and satisfied EW. You have escaped EN because the antecedent of EN is now false, hence the requirement 
no longer applies to you. You have satisfied EW because you have satisfied the conditional embedded in 
the requirement. Intuitively, the distinction between escaping a requirement and satisfying it is normatively 
significant. This shows another difference between the wide and narrow scope theories of rationality. 
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2.3 The Bootstrapping of Reasons and the Normativity of Rationality 
So far the narrow scope view appears to be the preferable view. However, its alleged victory 
is pyrrhic for two reasons. The narrow scope view leads to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons 
and it conflicts with our intuition that rationality is normative. 
Consider a rather extreme example. Suppose Bert ridiculously believes he ought to axe his 
mother. Despite the oddity of his belief the narrow scope view requires Bert to intend to axe his 
mother. (For there is only one way to satisfy EN: by forming the enkratic intention.) But one may 
worry, how could rationality require Bert to do what he ought not to?  
Moreover, suppose that rationality is normative. That is, suppose there is a normative reason 
for you (either pro toto or pro tanto) to satisfy all requirements of rationality. Now if we accept the 
narrow scope view it follows that: necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, you have a reason to 
intend to F. But this is odd. For Bert arguably has no reason to intend to axe his mother. It is implau-
sible to hold that, by forming the belief that he ought to F, Bert can bootstrap into existence an illicit 
reason to intend to F.13 The wide scope view does not involve this oddity. The wide scope view, 
together with the normativity of rationality, at most entails that Bert has a reason to (either intend to 
F or drop the belief that he ought to F.) We do not get the odd result that Bert has a reason to intend 
to axe his mother. 
This brings us to two more desiderata I suggest a theory of rationality must attempt to meet. 
The third desideratum, D3, is to avoid illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. Moreover, I suggest 
contra Kolodny (2005) that we must preserve our well-entrenched intuition that rationality is norma-
tive. This is the final desideratum I offer; call it D4. This desideratum is not uncontroversial, of course, 
                                                
13 Broome (2013) and Kolodny (2005) agree. However, Schroeder (2007), given his non-reasons-first view, 
thinks that Bert has a normative reason (of negligible weight) to intend to axe his mother. 
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but if a theory of rationality respects it I find this to be a welcome result. We must relinquish D4 only 
as a last resort. 
We are now in an uncomfortable position. Neither the wide scope requirements nor the nar-
row scope requirements meet all four desiderata. However, I think we can make progress. In §4 I 
outline a hybrid theory of rationality which attempts to meet all four desiderata. The hybrid theory is 
made possible only after we notice a particular kind of normativity which underlies some of our beliefs 
and intentions. I give an account of it in the next section. Furthermore, throughout this paper I give 
no direct argument to accept D2 (rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable 
ways), D3 (avoid illicit bootstrapping of reasons), and D4 (preserve the normativity of rationality). But 
I do find these desiderata fairly plausible. As for D1 (capture the force of the wrong of irrationality) I 
find it equally important. But it is also the most controversial. The argument of the next section (spe-
cifically, §3.3) indirectly defends D1. 
 
3. Consequential Commitments 
3.1 Avowal and Consequential Commitments 
We hold many attitudes. Some of those attitudes are distinctive in that we avow them from 
the first person point of view. To avow an attitude is to deem it answerable to justificatory reasons for 
it (even when we do not have a full grasp of those reasons.) We can contrast avowed attitudes with 
alienated attitudes. Alienated attitudes are those attitudes we find impervious to justificatory reasons 
for them. At best we attribute them to ourselves on the basis of behavioral evidence.14 Two prime 
examples of attitudes that we typically avow are beliefs and intentions. We often recognize, from the 
                                                
14 Repressed racist beliefs are an example. Gendler’s (2008) ‘aliefs’ may also qualify as alienated attitudes. 
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first person point of view, that some of our beliefs and intentions are answerable to justificatory rea-
sons for them. (Now onward, I limit my discussion to beliefs and intention; I use the term ‘attitudes’ 
to refer only to them.) 
A clarification is on order. I do not mean to suggest that avowed attitudes result from explicit 
deliberation. Nor do I mean to propose that avowed attitudes are the current focus of our attention. 
But I do think that, if we choose to focus on them, we ourselves see that these attitudes are answerable 
to justificatory reasons for them. As Moran (1997:143) helpfully puts it, alienated attitudes are discov-
eries whereas avowed attitudes are declarations (at times, potential) from the first person point of 
view. 
This is not all. Moran (2001:95) suggests that avowing an attitude involves “the binding of 
oneself to a certain course of action (or proposition.)”15 What does ‘binding oneself’ mean here? I 
propose the following answer: to avow an attitude is to thereby undertake consequential commitments. We 
cannot fully recognize even understand an avowed attitude if, having acquired it, we are thereby not 
committed to having other attitudes. To avow an attitude must make a difference to, and must have 
consequences for, what else it is now appropriate to do and think from our point of view. In case of 
Alex, for instance, it is plausible to hold that his avowed belief that he ought to order salad thereby 
commits him to intend to order it. Without this assumption I do not see how we could understand 
what his avowed belief amounts to. Indeed, I do not see why we must call it an avowed belief in the 
first place. 
                                                
15 To be sure, Moran make this claim about the aim of deliberation. However, he also holds that delibera-
tion, implicit or explicit, results in attitudes that we typically avow. I take him to further hold, implicitly, 
that avowing an attitude, among other things, shares the aim of deliberation.  
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By avowing his normative belief, then, Alex by his own lights is committed to intend accord-
ingly.16 To generalize, when you avow an attitude you thereby undertake consequential commitments 
to have certain other attitudes or perform certain actions. Attributing an avowed attitude to an agent, 
therefore, goes together with attributing to her the undertaking of consequential commitments which 
flow from the avowed attitude.  
The undertaking of consequential commitment, in my view, is a matter of objective, not sub-
jective, commitment. Though it is up to you to form a particular belief that you ought to F, it is not 
up to you what consequential commitments flow from your normative belief. For instance, despite 
holding the normative belief to order salad, Alex might explicitly deny undertaking of the correspond-
ing consequential commitment. Yet, regardless of what Alex thinks, Alex has undertaken the conse-
quential commitment to form the enkratic intention, whether he likes it or not. For otherwise, it is 
hard to grasp what his avowal of belief would amount to. The undertaking of consequential commit-
ments, then, is hardly a matter of meeting your own standard about what commitments flow from the 
avowed attitude. 
 
3.2 Consequential Commitments and Attitudinal Integrity 
Our capacity to hold avowed attitudes is a typical (albeit not the only) manifestation of our 
agency.17 We are the kind of agents who are believers and intenders. Moreover, we avow our attitudes 
                                                
16 Admittedly, I have reached the conclusion rather swiftly. For you might think that even if it is granted 
that avowing an attitude must make a difference to a person’s forthcoming behavior, does this justify the 
conclusion that the person has undertaken a commitment to modify his behavior in the relevant way? This 
is my view, indeed. To allay your suspicion, I should mention that my use of the term ‘commitment’ is 
meant to capture the normative weight that avowal adds to the equation. I do not mean to use the term in 
any stronger sense than that. 
17 It might also be a central feature of our agency. However, the stronger claim is not needed for my argu-
ment.  
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in that we take our attitudes to be answerable to justificatory reasons for them. It is particularly prob-
lematic, then, if we ourselves cut our avowed attitudes off at their knees (now onwards, let’s call 
avowed attitudes, simply ‘attitudes.’) Self-undermining of attitudes occurs when an agent violates the 
consequential commitments that flow from her attitudes. And when an agent does not undermine her 
particular attitudes in this way, she exhibits what I call ‘attitudinal integrity’ (of the agent) with respect 
to those attitudes.18 
To clarify, note that an agent might undermine her attitudes in at least two ways. The two ways 
of undermining attitudes correspond to the two kinds of consequential commitments that flow from 
attitudes; let’s call them A-type and B-type consequential commitments respectively. The first way of 
undermining attitudes relates to how an agent modulates her network of attitudes. An agent may (a) 
enmesh her attitudes in a self-impairing network of attitudes, or (b) fail to extend her network of 
attitudes in appropriate ways, such that some particular attitudes are not afforded the possibility of 
success as the attitudes they are. The notion of success of attitudes may be understood in terms of the 
roles those attitudes are expected to play within the attitudinal network.19 In case of (a), for example, 
                                                
18 I should emphasize that attitudinal integrity of an agent is a local, not a global, matter because it is 
measured with respect to individual attitudes or particular sets of attitudes an agent holds. Moreover, note 
that alienated attitudes also involve consequential commitments. But the violation of consequential com-
mitments which flows from avowed attitudes additionally threatens the attitudinal integrity of an agent. 
No analogous threat arises in the case of alienated attitudes. 
19 Importantly, when the attitudes fail to play the expected roles, we rightly attribute the responsibility for 
this failure to the agent. The reason is that we expect the agent to ensure, when possible, that her attitudes 
play the expected roles in her attitudinal network. Now, what expectations we hold, or ought to hold, 
about the roles particular attitudes must play in the attitudinal network of a particular agent may depart 
from that agents’ own opinion about the matter. For the appropriate expectations correspond to what in 
fact preserves the attitudinal integrity of the agent. In §3.1, I made a parallel claim about consequential 
commitments when I said that it is not up to a particular agent to decide what consequential commitments 
flow from her avowed attitudes. In defense of this claim, I argued that otherwise it would be difficult to 
understand what the avowed attitude amounts to. Why would it be difficult? Admittedly, my argument in 
the paper provides no deep answer to this question. However, I have now gestured at the beginnings of at 
least one possible answer: avowing an attitude stakes the attitudinal integrity of the agents with respect to 
that attitude. For if that were not the case, then it is hard to understand what if anything is special about 
avowal. Indeed, it would remain difficult to understand how avowal introduces any normativity into the 
equation. Also see n.16. 
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the belief that P is expected to eliminate obviously contradictory beliefs from the attitudinal network. 
So if an agent holds obviously contradictory attitudes, the attitudes appear to work against each other 
such that the possibility of their success gets undermined. Similarly, consider the case of (b). If an 
agent falls prey to akrasia or some other kind of rational break down—say, she intends to F but fails 
to intend the necessary means obviously implied by F, or she believes that P but fails to bring herself 
to believe its obvious implication, and so on—then that agent has failed to extend her existing network 
of attitudes in a way that would afford the possibility of success to her original attitudes. For instance, 
Alex has failed to intend according to his corresponding belief, and as a result the possibility of success 
of Alex’s corresponding belief gets undermined. 
To generalize, the A-type consequential commitments are those commitments an agent un-
dertakes such that, if she follows through on them, her respective attitudes are afforded the possibility 
of success as the attitudes they are. Thereby, the agent preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect 
to those attitudes. And if the agent violates those consequential commitments, she thereby undermines 
her attitudinal integrity with respect to those attitudes.20 
                                                
20 I am indebted here to Langlois (ms.) Especially, I borrow from him the helpful term ‘attitudinal integrity.’ 
However, my specification of the term is different from his. I should also make an additional point here 
with help of an example. Suppose you rightly believe that Peano axioms are true. At the same time, you 
do not believe a particular result about the natural numbers. Perhaps you tried to prove the result from 
the axioms but you were unsuccessful. Furthermore, suppose that the result you think is false is in fact 
true. In that case, you appear to hold contradictory beliefs: for the result would deductively follow from 
the axioms you believe to be true. Is it fair to say that, for holding contradictory beliefs in this case, your 
attitudinal integrity is undermined? Intuitively, your attitudinal integrity does remain intact and I’m inclined 
to agree. Can my view explain this datum? As the view stands, it cannot fully explain it, or at least not 
explain it easily. For that reason, we need a deeper understanding of what attitudinal integrity amounts to. 
I can only gesture at a possible answer. Attitudinal integrity, and the success of particular attitudes, appear 
to be degree concept which must be fleshed out in light of the context of a particular person. In the 
example being considered, your attitudinal integrity remains intact because the success of your belief about 
the truth of Peano axioms is not undermined like it would be undermined in the case of someone who 
might hold obviously contradictory beliefs. Very roughly, the “distance” between your contradictory be-
liefs is greater than the corresponding “distance” between the relevant beliefs of the other person. I admit 
this proposal is rather vague. But any attempt to sufficiently sharpen it here will take us too far afield. 
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There is a second way in which an agent may undermine her attitudes. She may undermine 
them by giving them up in objectionable ways. Robin’s behavior is a case in point. She gives up her 
belief that she ought to F by engaging in self-deception. Recall that when Robin avows her belief that 
she ought to F, she deems it answerable to justificatory reasons for it. However, by engaging in self-
deception Robin drops this belief in a way which is not fully sensitive to her avowal. For she rational-
izes her behavior by inappropriately taking her failure to intend enkratically to be a justificatory reason 
to drop her corresponding belief. For this reasons, her original belief that she ought to F gets under-
mined. We have arrived at the B-type consequential commitments that flow from avowed attitudes: 
they are the commitments not to drop the respective attitudes in objectionable ways. B-type conse-
quential commitments involve retrospective sensitivity to the avowal of original attitudes. If an agent 
follows through on these commitments, she thereby preserves her attitudinal integrity with respect to 
those attitudes.  
It is important to note that the dropping of attitudes in unobjectionable ways (i.e., ways sensi-
tive to the avowal of respective attitudes) does not undermine the attitudinal integrity of an agent with 
respect to the respective attitudes. Rather, this preserves the attitudinal integrity of an agent. Had Alex 
or Robin dropped their respective normative beliefs say for doubting their truth, their beliefs would 
have simply dropped out of their respective networks of attitudes, along with both kinds of conse-
quential commitments that flow from them. In that case, the respective attitudinal integrity of both 
Alex and Robin would remain intact. 
Here I should make an important point. My proposal—that our attitudes involve us in conse-
quential commitments—runs the risk of being assimilated to apparently similar but ultimately different 
proposals. For example, Scanlon (2007:92) argues that intending to A “involves a commitment on 
one’s part to think about what to do in a way this is compatible with one’s doing A.” However, on 
Scanlon’s view (2014:57) the ultimate source of this commitment is one’s belief about reasons for and 
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against one’s attitude. Beliefs about reasons are beliefs with practical content. And these beliefs, ac-
cording to Scanlon, commit us to going on in a certain way.21 My proposal of consequential commit-
ments is different from Scanlon’s. Consequential commitments flow from avowed attitudes. Avowing 
an attitude does not require an agent to hold a belief about corresponding reasons. Rather, what is 
distinctive about avowing an attitude is that the agent finds her attitude answerable to justificatory 
reasons for it, and thereby the agent binds herself to going on in a certain way. 
In sum, consequential commitments have two distinctive features. First, they flow from 
avowed attitudes whether or not the avowal involves a belief about reasons for and against those 
attitudes. Secondly, there are at least two kinds of consequential commitments, A-type and B-type 
consequential commitments. Consequential commitments of both kinds are those commitments an 
agent undertakes such that, if the agent follows though on them, she in fact preserves her attitudinal 
integrity with respect to the respective attitudes. In the next sub-section, I argue that my account of 
consequential commitments provides an insight into what the wrong of irrationality consists in.  
 
3.3 The Wrong of Irrationality 
 To hold an avowed attitude is to thereby undertake consequential commitments. Note that 
there is a gap between undertaking of consequential commitments and following through on them. 
                                                
21 I am indebted here to Hinchman (2013). Furthermore, I should note that my account of rationality vis-
a-vis attitudinal commitments (in §4) is “weaker” than Scanlon’s. Given Scanlon’s account of attitudinal 
commitments it seems reasonable to infer that one must follow-through on these commitments. Hence, 
Scanlon holds a narrow scope view of rational requirements. My account of consequential commitments—
in terms of the A-type and B-type consequential commitments—does not require this inference. My de-
parture from Scanlon will be important in §4.2 where I argue, contra Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005), 
that rationality is not a matter of following through on attitudinal commitments. Rather, I will propose 
that rationality is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the conse-
quential commitments we undertake. Instead to the narrow scope view, I will argue that a theory of ra-
tionality includes wide scope requirements in conjunction with the basing prohibitions of rationality. 
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This gap provides us with the resources to better understand irrational behavior. Let’s start with akra-
sia. An akratic agent holds an attitude, undertakes consequential commitments, but fails to follow 
through on the A-type consequential commitment.  
 Now recall that on the wide scope view, the wrong of enkratic akrasia consists in violating the 
wide scope enkratic requirement, EW. Violation of EW entails:  
WrongW: Necessarily, you are going wrong (if you believe you ought to F, but you do not 
intend to F.)22 
WrongW effectively charges Alex of being in an incoherent state of mind. Against the background of 
consequential commitments, we can see why WrongW is implausibly weak. Alex has not committed 
the wrong of merely falling prey to incoherence. The charge against Alex of having gone wrong is 
more forceful. The charge is that having undertaken a consequential commitment Alex has failed to 
direct his behavior in light of it. The violation of consequential commitment amounts to self-under-
mining of his original belief and thereby undermines his attitudinal integrity with respect to his belief. 
This is not to say, however, that WrongW is false. I think it is true. The claim is that it is implausibly 
weak. The stronger principle we are looking for is the following: 
WrongN: Necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, you are going wrong (for failing to intend 
to F.) 
WrongN is the narrow scope counterpart of WrongW. WrongN is entailed by the violation of the 
corresponding narrow scope rational requirement, EN. WrongN takes as its scope the failure to intend 
to F. On the view I have proposed so far, WrongN amounts to the charge that, by failing to intend 
enkratically, Alex has failed to follow through on the consequential commitment he had undertaken. 
WrongN fully captures the force of the wrong of enkratic akrasia. 
                                                
22 Violation of the other requirements, e.g. the instrumental requirement, would entail the corresponding 
‘Wrong’ principles. 
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Beside the wrong of akrasia, the gap between the undertaking of consequential commitments 
and following through on them also provides a deeper understanding of the wrong of rationalization.23 
For instance, Robin has gone wrong because she violated the B-type consequential commitment she 
had undertaken, i.e., the commitment not to drop her normative belief on the basis of her failure to 
intend enkratically. Both akratic and rationalizing behavior lead to self-undermining of one’s attitudes 
and hence threaten one’s attitudinal integrity. That is why you go wrong in a forceful sense when you 
are irrational. 
The wrong of irrationality, then, does not amount to incoherence for it is more forceful than 
that. It amounts to the violation of consequential commitments one had undertaken When evaluating 
a person of being irrational, a theory of rationality must be sensitive to the force of the wrong of 
irrationality. This is the first desideratum, D1. If not uncontroversial, I hope D1 sounds plausible now. 
We must attempt to meet it together with meeting the other three desiderata. We now have the re-
quired background to outline a theory of rationality which meets all four desiderata. This is the task 
of the next section. 
 
4. A Hybrid Theory of Rationality 
 To recap, our discussion so far has revealed four desiderata a theory of rationality must attempt 
to meet. I list them here again. 
D1: Capture the force of the wrong of irrationality. 
D2: Rational requirements must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways.  
D3: Avoid illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. 
 D4: Preserve the normativity of rationality. 
                                                
23 I give a formal formulation of the wrong of rationalization in §4.3. I have already given two formal 
interpretations of the wrong of akrasia, namely, WrongW and WrongN. 
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We have seen that narrow scope rational requirements meet D1 and D2, but they fail to meet D3 and 
D4. By contrast, wide scope rational requirements meet D3 and D4, but they fail to meet D1 and D2. It 
would be helpful progress if a theory of rationality could meet all four desiderata. This is the task of 
this section. Let’s start with desiderata D3 and D4. After that, we will move up the list, first to D2 and 
finally D1. 
 
4.1 Desiderata D3 and D4 : Illicit Bootstrapping and the Normativity of Rationality 
Recall the case of Bert. He ridiculously believes that he ought to axe his mother. What must 
rationality require him to do? If we accept the narrow scope view together with the normativity of 
rationality, the implication is that Bert has bootstrapped into existence a normative reason to intend 
to axe his mother. This is illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. If possible we must avoid it.24 
Therefore, I think we must accept the wide scope rational requirements. In case of enkratic rationality, 
we must accept EW instead of EN. Together with the assumption that rationality is normative, EW does 
not entail illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons. At most it entails that Bert has a reason to either 
form the enkratic intention or drop the normative belief. We do not get the odd result that Bert has a 
normative reason to intend to axe his mother. By accepting wide scope requirements, we satisfy both 
D3 and D4. 
 
4.2 Desideratum D2 : Rational Requirements Must Not be Symmetrical in Objectionable Ways 
Now we have the task cut out for us. We have seen that the problem with accepting wide 
scope rational requirements is that they fail to meet D2 (and D1.) In case of enkratic rationality, recall 
                                                
24 If we accept the reasons-first view of normative reasons, then to my knowledge there is no narrow scope 
theory of rationality which meets both D3 and D4. The most recent statement of the narrow scope view, 
to my knowledge, is Lord (2014). It fails to meet D3 and D4. Korsgaard (2008) meets D4 but she finds D3 
implausible. However, as noted earlier, her view is not a reasons-first view. 
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that EW requires that you satisfy a conditional. In case of Robin who rationalizes here behavior, EW is 
symmetrical in that it makes no comparative judgments of rationality between Robin’s forming the 
enkratic intention and Robin’s dropping her normative belief on the basis of her failure to form the 
enkratic intention. However, we think that Robin’s normative situation is not symmetrical in this way. 
Robin must not drop her normative belief on the basis of her failure to intend enkratically. Rationality 
must not legitimize rationalization. 
Broome (2013) offers a solution to the symmetry problem. His solution is not entirely satis-
factory but it is on the right track. Let us focus on his solution and amend it for its shortcomings. 
Broome (2013:187) argues that we need not capture the relevant normative asymmetries within the 
enkratic requirement. A theory of rationality includes several requirements of rationality. We may in-
troduce separate negative requirements of rationality within the theory to handle these difficult cases. 
He calls these negative requirements ‘basing prohibitions’. There are several basing prohibitions but 
the one relevant to enkrasia is: 
EP: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that you do not drop your belief that you ought to 
F on the basis of your not intending to F. 
EP rules out cases of rationalization. When Robin gives up her normative belief on the basis of her 
failure to intend enkratically, she violates EP despite satisfying EW. Even though EW predicts objec-
tionable normative symmetry, EP takes care of it. By rationality’s lights, Robin counts as irrational. 
Broome’s solution to the symmetry problem has at least two shortcomings. First, note that 
the cases of symmetry are offered as counter-examples to the wide scope requirements. It seems arti-
ficial to introduce separate negative requirements of rationality just to accommodate the counter-ex-
amples. We would not be suspicious, however, were we offered a unified and satisfying account of 
the source of both positive and negative rational requirements. But Broome does not offer it. Broome 
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(2013:150) thinks he has no general method of identifying rational requirements and basing prohibi-
tions: “I find myself forced to appeal largely to our intuitions.” 
Secondly, note that Broome’s solution to the symmetry problem allows rationalizing behavior 
to satisfy the corresponding enkratic requirement. Despite violating EP, Robin satisfies EW. For one 
way to satisfy EW is to drop the normative belief, and Robin does precisely that albeit in an objection-
able way. This is an odd result. For Broome (unpublished) himself remarks, “if you are to become 
more rational—if your degree of rationality is to increase—you must come to satisfy requirements of 
rationality that previously you did not satisfy.” Besides violating EP, Robin’s irrational behavior does 
make her satisfy EW which she previously did not satisfy. It is an odd result of Broome’s view that 
Robin’s irrational behavior figures positively—even when its positive effect is offset by the violation of 
basing prohibition—in determining the extent of Robin’s rationality. By contrast, I think a satisfactory 
solution to the symmetry problem must have at least two features. First, it must ensure that rational-
izing behavior merits the charge of irrationality. Broome’s solution has this feature. But secondly, the 
solution must ensure that rationalizing behavior does not satisfy the corresponding requirement of ra-
tionality. Broome’s solution does not have this feature. (In case of enkratic rationality, the correspond-
ing requirement is the specific enkratic requirement which corresponds to the basing prohibition vio-
lated by rationalizing behavior. This is not to say, however, that irrational behavior must not satisfy 
any requirement of rationality. That claim would be implausibly strong.)  
Note that the source of the oddity of Broome’s view is not the introduction of basing prohi-
bitions in response to the symmetry problem. To see why, let’s retain his solution, EP, but replace EW 
with EN. Now Robin’s rationalizing behavior violates EP but neither satisfies nor violates EN. By drop-
ping her normative belief Robin escapes the narrow scope enkratic requirement. This is the case because 
rationalizing behavior denies the antecedent of EN. Therefore, the requirement no longer applies. 
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Hence, the odd result of Broome’s view is avoided while retaining his solution to the symmetry prob-
lem. Now you might wonder whether a narrow scope theory needs to retain Broome’s solution in 
order to address the symmetry problem. After all, narrow scope requirements are not symmetrical like 
the wide scope requirements. I think even the narrow scope theories need the basing prohibitions. 
For the narrow scope requirement alone is not sufficient to capture the extent of normative asym-
metry.25 Remember that the asymmetry we want to explain is this: rationalizing behavior is always 
irrational, and enkratic behavior is always rational. EN captures the second conjunct, for the only way 
to satisfy it is to intend enkratically. However, EN is silent over the first conjunct, for it does not 
prohibit rationalizing behavior.26 In order to capture the full extent of the relevant asymmetry, the 
enkratic requirement, wide or narrow, needs supplementing with help of a negative requirements. That 
requirement is the basing prohibition, EP.  
This observation has two upshots. First, contrary to the typical opinion, I think the foremost 
location of the battle over wide and narrow scope requirements is not the symmetry considerations; 
the location lies elsewhere. For in order to capture the full extent of the normative asymmetry, a theory 
of rationality needs the basing prohibitions regardless of whether the theory includes wide or a narrow 
scope rational requirements.27 However, I would like to focus on the second upshot of our observa-
tion, which is that the source of the oddity of Broome’s view, as argued above, is not the basing 
prohibitions. In my view, the source of the oddity is the way Broome’s theory brings together wide 
                                                
25 Broome (2013:142) and Lord (2014) also make this observation. 
26 This is true regardless of whether we specify the narrow scope requirement as a state requirement, or, 
following Kolodny (2007), as a process requirement. 
27 Lord (2014) suggests that the symmetry considerations are the decisive battleground for the choice be-
tween wide and narrow scope requirements. In light of our observation above, the foremost location of 
the battle changes. What does it change to? In my view, it changes to the nature of normative reasons. For 
if we accept the reasons-first view, there is considerable pressure to accept the wide scope view. If we 
reject the reasons-first view, the pressure is relieved. For this reasons, it is no surprise then that both as 
Korsgaard and Schroeder, who deny the reasons-first view, hold the narrow scope view of rational require-
ments.  
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scope requirements and basing prohibitions. I suggest there is a better way to understand the relation-
ship between the two kinds of requirements. Recall that we posed the cases of rationalization as coun-
ter-examples to wide scope requirements. We noted that, unless we have a satisfactory and unified 
account of the source of both positive and negative rational requirements, it appears artificial to in-
troduce separate negative requirements (i.e. the basing prohibition) only to accommodate the counter-
examples. Broome thinks he has no satisfying account to offer. We have the resources to offer a 
unified account of the source of both positive and negative requirements of rationality. This unified 
account sheds light on the relationship between the two kinds of requirements. 
In my view, all rational requirements, positive and negative, are requirements of attitudinal 
integrity so that the neglect of them makes you out of order. The neglect makes you out of order in 
the sense that you undermine your attitudes by violating the corresponding consequential commit-
ments. And thereby, you fail to preserve your attitudinal integrity with respect to the respective atti-
tudes. Now recall from §3.2 that avowed attitudes involve two kinds of consequential commitments. 
In case of enkratic rationality, the avowed normative belief that you ought to F involves, first, the A-
type consequential commitment to form the enkratic intention. Secondly, it involves the B-type con-
sequential commitment not to drop the normative belief in an objectionable way. If you fail to follow 
through on either of these consequential commitments, you thereby undermine your attitudinal integ-
rity with respect to your respective normative belief. Given this background, let’s see what the enkratic 
requirement amounts to. First, in order to preserve your attitudinal integrity you might (i) make your 
attitudes coherent by forming the enkratic intention, or (ii) you might give up your normative belief. 
This amounts to EW. Secondly, you might undermine your attitudinal integrity by giving up your nor-
mative belief in an objectionable way, say by rationalizing your behavior. That would result in achiev-
ing coherence among your attitudes in a way which is blind to the B-type consequential commitment. 
Enkratic rationality must not allow that. This prohibition amounts to EP. In order to preserve your 
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attitudinal integrity, then, enkratic rationality requires that you maintain coherence among your rele-
vant attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments you have undertaken. EW guides 
you how to achieve coherence and EP rules out the objectionable way to achieve it. Both the positive 
and the negative requirement together ensure that, if you satisfy them, you thereby preserve your attitu-
dinal integrity. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that the basing prohibition is part of the 
requirement of enkratic rationality. The modified enkratic requirement amounts to the conjunction 
(EW AND EP).28  
If we accept the modified requirement, rationalizing behavior no longer satisfies the corre-
sponding requirement of rationality. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she satisfies the first con-
junct but she violates the second conjunct. She does not satisfy the overall requirement. We no longer 
face the odd result of Broome’s view. We have arrived at a satisfactory solution to the symmetry 
problem. 
I should emphasize that our modification to the requirement is only made possible against the 
background of the additional normative element we have introduced, namely, the element of conse-
quential commitments. Since Broome’s view lacks this normative element, Broome does not anticipate 
the proposed solution.29 
 
4.2.1 The Scanlon-Kolodny View of Rationality 
You might find the modified requirement objectionable for the following reason. You might 
think that making the basing prohibition part of the rational requirement conflicts with the preferred 
view of rationality endorsed by some reasons-first theorists. For instance, Scanlon (2014) and Kolodny 
                                                
28 The requirement might include additional conjuncts in order to rule out additional objectionable ways 
to drop attitudes. At any rate, the requirement must at least include the basing prohibition. 
29 My modified requirement also satisfies Schroeder’s (2004:346) demand that the solution to the symmetry 
problem must locate the irrationality of rationalizing behavior within the respective rational requirement. 
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(2005) endorse the reasons-first view. Moreover, both of them think that rationality is a matter of 
bringing your attitudes in line with your beliefs about reasons. Kolodny (2005:524), for instance, offers 
the following two ‘core’ requirements of rationality from which all other requirements are supposed 
to derive.  
C+: Rationality requires one to have A if one believes that one has conclusive reason to have A. 
C-: Rationality requires one not to have A if one believes that one lacks sufficient reason to have 
A. 30 
Call this view the ‘Scanlon-Kolodny view’ of rationality. Now note that the basing prohibitions do not 
appeal to normative beliefs of agents about their assessment of reasons. Therefore, the objection 
holds, the basing prohibitions cannot be part of rational requirements. At most, they must be treated 
as a special case. 
 There are two ways we might attempt to address this worry. The first way is to accept the 
Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality and adjust the basing prohibitions accordingly. We can formulate 
the basing prohibitions as conditional requirements involving normative beliefs about assessment of 
reasons. We can interpret the conditional formulation of EP as either a wide scope or a narrow scope 
prohibition in the following ways: 
EPW: Necessarily, rationality requires of you that (if you believe you ought to F, you do not 
drop your normative belief on the basis of your not intending to F.)  
and, 
EPN: Necessarily, if you believe you ought to F, rationality requires of you that (you do not 
drop your normative belief on the basis of your not intending to F.) 
This solution has already failed. Both EPW and EPN are unacceptable. EPW is not acceptable because 
rationalizing behavior satisfies it. You can satisfy EPW by dropping your normative belief that you 
                                                
30 Also compare Parfit (2011:111). 
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ought to F. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she does precisely that. Moreover, EPN is not ac-
ceptable either. Although it has the same satisfaction conditions as EP it has different violation con-
ditions. When Robin rationalizes her behavior, she violates EP but she escapes EPN. The reason is that 
her rationalizing behavior violates the antecedent of EPN. Therefore, we have good reason to preserve 
EP in its original formulation. 
In my view there is a better way to address the worry we started with. I have motivated in §3.2 
that consequential commitments can be understood independently of an agent’s beliefs about reasons 
for and against her attitudes. Against this background, I moreover suggest that we have good reason 
to deny the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality without thereby giving up the reasons-first view of 
normative reasons. I suggest that forming beliefs about reasons, and acting in light of them, is not the 
only species of an agents’ attempt at responding to reasons. What is distinctive about reason-respon-
sive agents is their capability to avow their attitudes and, as a result, undertake consequential commit-
ments. Avowing attitude does not essentially involve forming beliefs about reasons. It is enough for 
avowal that an agent finds her attitudes answerable to justificatory reasons for them. In contrast to 
the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality, then, I propose that rationality is a matter of making one’s 
attitudes coherent in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments one undertakes.31 
If the above proposal is plausible then the fact that agents undertake consequential commit-
ments must guide our understanding of the content of rational requirements. And I have argued that 
when we heed consequential commitments, we reach the modified requirement (EW AND EP). Now 
note that by bringing in the element of consequential commitments—an element which appears to be 
more amenable to non-reasons-first views—we have not given up on the central commitment of the 
reasons-first views. For nothing we have proposed undercuts the claim that normative reasons are 
                                                
31 To be sure, rationality as attitudinal coherence in commitment-sensitive ways might entail responsive-
ness to beliefs about reasons. The point is that rationality is not equivalent to responsiveness to beliefs about 
reasons. 
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independent of the present attitudes and activities of individual agents. Rather, we have arrived at an 
alternative understanding of what a view of rationality vis-à-vis the reasons-first view of normative 
reasons might look like. 
 In sum, I conclude that we must accept the modified requirements of rationality. The modified 
requirements of rationality include wide scope requirements in conjunction with the corresponding 
basing prohibitions. We have successfully satisfied the second desideratum, D2, that rational require-
ments must not be symmetrical in objectionable ways. Now we can move on to the only unmet de-
sideratum, D1, and attempt to satisfy it. 
 
4.3 Desideratum D1 : Capture the Force of The Wrong of Irrationality 
By accepting the modified enkratic requirement, (EW AND EP), we have successfully met 
three out of four desiderata, namely, D2, D3, and D4. But now we face a further difficulty. What does 
the violation of the modified enkratic requirement amount to? We saw above that violation of EW 
entails WrongW. Moreover, the violation of EP entails: 
WrongP: Necessarily, you are going wrong when you drop your belief that you ought to F on 
the basis of your not intending to F. 
Therefore, the violation of the modified requirement (EW AND EP) entails (WrongW OR WrongP.) 
But I have criticized WrongW, in §3.3, for being implausibly weak. It does not capture the force of the 
wrong of irrationality. Note, however, that the second disjunct, WrongP, is not problematic. First, it 
is shared by both wide and narrow scope theories of rationality because it is entailed by the violation 
of a basing prohibition which I argued is shared by both theories. Secondly, WrongP is not implausibly 
weak because it does not level a charge of incoherence. On my view, WrongP amounts to the claim 
that you are going wrong when you give up your original attitude in a way which violates the B-type 
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consequential commitment. Therefore, the only problematic disjunct is WrongW. Against WrongW, I 
have argued that we must accept WrongN in order to capture the force of the wrong of irrationality. 
 One way to accept WrongN is to accept the narrow scope requirement: (EN AND EP). The 
violation of this requirement entails (WrongN OR WrongP). Consequently, we are able to meet D1. 
But recall that EN, together with the normativity of rationality, entails illicit bootstrapping of normative 
reasons. This is an unwelcome result. Moreover, (EN AND EP) allows detachment which leads to 
counterintuitive results. In case of Bert, it requires him to intend to axe his mother. Broome (2007:365) 
rightly points out, “we should expect rationality to require you to get out of your irrational state, not 
to get in deeper.” We must resist (EN AND EP). 
We are now in an uncomfortable position. It appears that we must sacrifice at least one of the 
desiderata: either allow bootstrapping of normative reasons or remain insensitive to the force of the 
wrong of irrationality. However, I think we can make progress on this front too. We must draw a 
distinction between prescriptive and evaluative principles of rationality. Prescriptive principles tell us what 
to do or what to avoid in order to be rational. And evaluative principles assess whether a person is 
rational or irrational. (EW AND EP) is both a prescriptive and an evaluative principle of rationality. It 
is prescriptive because it tells us what to do or what to avoid in order to be rational. And it is an 
evaluative principle because its violation entails the evaluative principle (WrongW OR WrongP) which 
evaluates whether, by rationality’s lights, you are going wrong. Now note that following remark by 
Thomas Nagel (1970:20): “rationality can be defined only in terms of adherence to rational require-
ments.” Many theorists of rationality, including Broome and Kolodny, assume the truth of this claim 
and extrapolate that the wrong of irrationality wholly consists in the violation of rational requirements. 
I reject this extrapolation. 
I have introduced an additional normative element above, the element of consequential com-
mitment. And I have argued that, from the point of view of rationality, you are going wrong in a 
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forceful way when you violate consequential commitments. This violation must figure in evaluating 
the wrong of irrationality. In order to do that, we must accept WrongN. Since we must resist (EN 
AND EP), as rationality cannot be a source of illicit bootstrapping of reasons, I propose that we 
introduce the narrow scope WrongN as a separate, purely evaluative, principle of rationality. I call it 
‘purely’ evaluative because it is not entailed by any prescriptive principle in our theory. (For we do not 
accept the narrow scope rational requirements.) Yet if you happen to satisfy WrongN you are thereby 
evaluated as going wrong. Therefore, the wrong of irrationality does not wholly consist in violating 
the rational requirements. It additionally consists in violating consequential commitments you had 
undertaken (that is to say, it additionally consists in satisfying WrongN.) 
My proposal should sound intuitive. Rationality requires that you maintain coherence among 
your attitudes in ways sensitive to the consequential commitments you undertake. In case of akraisa, 
when you fail at this task, rationality thereby evaluates you as going wrong for being incoherent. But 
this does not mean that rationality must charge you of incoherence alone and remain blind to the fact 
that you additionally violated a consequential commitment. Rather, rationality must additionally evalu-
ate you for violating a consequential commitment, without thereby requiring you to follow through on 
consequential commitment. For the latter would amount to the narrow scope view which would le-
gitimize bootstrapping of illicit reasons. Hence WrongN must be introduced as a separate principle 
without accepting EN.32 In sum, enkratic rationality requires (EW AND EP); whereas when you’re 
enkratically irrational, you are evaluated as going wrong as: (WrongW OR WrongP OR WrongN). As 
a consequence, our theory of enkratic rationality successfully satisfies D1: it captures the force of the 
wrong of irrationality. 
                                                
32 Since we have accepted (EW AND EP), I should emphasize that EW does not require you to follow 
through on consequential commitments. It requires you either to follow through or to give up your corre-
sponding belief together with the consequential commitments that flows from it. EP ensures that you do 
not give up your belief in an objectionable way. 
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My account of enkratic rationality is now complete. We have managed to satisfy all four de-
siderata. We may generalize our account to all conditional requirements of rationality. In our theory 
of rationality, first, each wide scope conditional requirement of rationality is in conjunction with the 
corresponding basing prohibition. Secondly, for every requirement that involves a wide scope con-
junct, there exists, in addition, a purely evaluative narrow scope principle of rationality. The proposed 
theory, then, is a hybrid theory of rationality. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In the preceding discussion we have seen that wide and narrow scope rational requirements 
each have their shortcomings. Wide scope requirements fail to capture the force of the wrong of 
irrationality and they are symmetrical in objectionable ways. Narrow scope requirements, on the other 
hand, do not face these difficulties. However, they lead to illicit bootstrapping of normative reasons 
and fail to preserve the normativity of rationality. In this paper I think we have made progress. I have 
proposed an account of consequential commitments which are normative commitments that flow 
from avowed attitudes. Moreover, contra the Scanlon-Kolodny view of rationality, I have argued that 
rationality is a matter of maintaining coherence among our attitudes in ways sensitive to the conse-
quential commitments we undertake. This backgrounds makes possible a hybrid theory of rationality. 
The theory includes (a) wide scope rational requirements in conjunction with the corresponding basing 
prohibitions of rationality; and (b) purely evaluative narrow scope principles of rationality. The hybrid 
theory successfully meets the four desiderata above. This is a welcome result. 
I conclude with emphasizing the proviso with which I commenced the discussion. We have 
arrived at a conditional conclusion. If the reasons-first view of normative reasons is correct, then the 
hybrid theory of rationality is the preferable theory. Given my list of four desiderata, a purely wide 
scope theory appears unacceptable. However, if it turns out that the antecedent of our conclusion is 
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false, then the list of desiderata I have laid out might change. For instance, if a version of the non-
reasons-first view turns out to be correct, then we may tolerate bootstrapping of normative reasons. 
The resulting theory of rationality, then, might be a purely narrow scope theory. One thing we have 
learned from our discussion, then, is that the battle over the narrow scope versus hybrid theory of 
rationality is to be ultimately fought over the nature of normative reasons. 
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